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Economists  have  been trying  to  deal  with technical  trade barriers  in  agriculture  for
decades (Hillman  1978).  It is a difficult  conceptual  and empirical  subject that will not be
settled soon.  Recently,  trade policy economists  have noted that appropriate  treatment  of
technical barriers  in trade policy modelling may be of growing importance.  One standard
argument is that,  as other non-tariff barriers in agriculture  are eliminated  and as tariffs are
reduced,  the relative (and  perhaps  absolute)  importance  of technical barriers  is  increased
(Josling  1994; Sumner  1995b).
Among the  most important  technical  trade barriers  are  those relating  to  sanitary  and
phytosanitary  [SPS] and food  safety concerns.  These were dealt with in several  places in
recent trade agreements.  The agriculture provisions of the Uruguay Round trade agreements
[URA] reduced the scope for non-tariff barriers  and lowered tariffs.  The provisions found
in the  Uruguay  Round  "Agreements  on the  Application  of Sanitary  and  Phytosanitary
Measures"  and  the  "Agreement  on  Technical  Barriers  to  Trade"  require  that  import
restrictions based on SPS claims be more consistent with science  and that technical barriers
in general be less arbitrary.
Analyses of SPS and other technical barriers have often been conducted as case studies.
The procedure has been to examine the effects of specific SPS measures on particular markets
(Forsyth and Lynch  1992).  Some of these efforts have detailed descriptive content  and can
show how specific barriers operate and the forces behind their adoption (Roberts and Orden
1995).  Other studies show the impact of relaxing or modifying trade rules.
However, most econometric and simulation  models that deal with the relaxation of trade
barriers have either ignored SPS and other technical  barriers,  or dealt with them in simplified
ways.  The standard approach is to assume that trade is either completely blocked by an SPS
barrier, or that trade is unaffected (Tyers and Anderson 1992).  For example,  in the analysis
of beef trade between foot and mouth free and foot and mouth endemic markets, the barrier
is considered absolute and its effects are then analyzed in two (or more) distinct markets.  For
some commodities and some markets this approach may be acceptable,  but simply assuming
that  SPS  rules either have no  effect  or imply that there  is no trade  is  clearly not  always
appropriate.  Therefore  a more detailed  assessment of the treatment  of technical barriers in
empirical trade models seems warranted.
The purpose of this paper  is to  explore ways  in which  SPS  and  other technical trade
barriers may affect (and be introduced into) empirical analysis of agricultural trade and trade
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273policy.  In particular,  we discuss some common types of SPS rules and how these  may be
represented  in  export  supply  and  import  demand  functions.  The  perspective  is  that  of
empirical  simulation models that incorporate trade policy components,  and which need to
account for SPS and other technical rules.  We explore, in particular, how we might use our
experience modeling other trade policies to model SPS barriers.  To provide  a context for the
discussion,  we focus on a specific region, North East Asia,  and a set of related commodity
markets.  In particular,  we use  a model  that  focuses  on  supply  and  demand  of rice  and
horticultural  products.
Agricultural Trade with SPS and Other Barriers in North East Asia
The agricultural markets in North East Asia have been relatively open for wheat, most
feed grains, oilseeds and cotton (USDA 1994).  Beef trade has recently been opened and has
expanded rapidly.  Japan and South Korea, in particular,  have long been major importers for
these  goods,  relying  on imports  for  a large  share  of their  domestic  use  of agricultural
products.  Both countries  are important to international  agricultural trade and agricultural
trade is important to these countries (Elleson and Dyck  1993; Lee, Jung-Hwan  1993).
The markets for rice and horticultural  commodities  have been much less open than the
markets  for  grains,  oilseeds  and  cotton.  In  Japan  and  South  Korea,  rice  and  many
horticultural crops have been restricted by non-tariff barriers (WTO  1994; Lee, Jaeok  1993).
These  are commodities  for which the URA  is likely to be  particularly important  (Sumner
1995a).
Rice markets are special in several ways.  First, rice by itself makes up  a major share of
cropland use and value of crop output for both Japan and South Korea.  Second, rice remains
a major component of the diet and,  especially,  of the total caloric intake of the population in
these countries.  Third, rice comprises a major share of total government  agricultural support.
Fourth, as a function of the previous three factors, rice imports remain subject  to absolute
import  quotas  (rather  than tariff rate quotas) under  the URA  on agriculture  (Japan  Food
Agency 1995; Kim 1993; Koo et al.  1992;  Suh  1993; Tsujii  1993).  Finally, even in the post-
Uruguay Round world, rice remains  special in the politics of North East Asia.
Markets for horticultural products  also have special  features.  There are many  distinct
horticultural product  markets, making aggregation  troublesome.  Products are not perfect
substitutes  or complements  and  relative  prices  are  not constant  so composite  commodity
theorems  do  not  hold.  Disaggregation  is  evident  in  the  tariff  schedules  that  these
commodities face.  For example, the URA schedule filed with the World Trade Organization
[WTO] by the Republic of Korea has hundreds of lines, from number 0601 to 0910, where
most of the horticultural products are listed, and another hundred or so lines from number
2001  to 2009, where processed horticultural products are listed.  Each separate tariff line
represents a product for which supplies,  demands and policies may be considered separately
and thus, modeled separately.  Each of these tariff lines may also have a distinct SPS barrier.
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barriers  concerning  standards,  testing,  labeling,  and  certification  are  most  often  cited  as
limiting  trade.  For  example,  rice  shipments  from  California  to  Japan  in  1995  incurred
substantial costs in complying with import requirements.  Some of these procedures  seemed
extreme:  "The Food Agency,  for example,  has hired a laboratory in Portland, Ore. to test
each  2,000-ton  lot of rice  for signs  of 63  pesticides  even  though only  six pesticides  are
allowed  in rice production  under California law"  (Tirschwell  1995,  p.  8A).  Some of the
required  procedures,  such as shipping rice in  small bags rather than in bulk,  allowed more
convenient handling in the Japanese marketing system.  Other procedures may have provided
assurance to Japanese customers.  However,  given that imports are controlled by the Japanese
government, there may have been an effort to raise the price of imported rice before it arrived
in Japan so  as to reduce adverse publicity from comparisons with domestic prices or to reduce
the markups applied within Japan that are used to reduce the retail price differential between
domestic and imported rice.  Japan met its URA minimum access  commitment  on rice.  It
was,  therefore,  not  using these technical  import  rules  to reduce the  import  quantity, that
quantity was fixed.  Instead the import rules affected the import price.
For products other than rice,  agricultural imports into these  countries are now subject
only to tariffs and tariff-rate quotas.  But technical  and administrative barriers remain.  This
is particularly true with horticultural  crops.  Included  in the list of "problems"  cited by the
United States [US] are health and safety  standards that deviate from international norms and
that are drafted so that they apply only to imports.  For example, the imports of horticultural
products into South Korea were reported by the US Trade Representative to be subject to
a number of restrictive and unjustified SPS regulations (USTR 1995).  These regulations were
questioned  relative to excessive inspection  or fumigation which added to costs and delayed
import delivery.'
A Simple Model with Trade and Trade Policies
A simple equilibrium  displacement model  may be used to consider the effects of trade
policy  and  other economic  changes  in agriculture.  The model  is used  to represent  crop
agriculture  in a country that is an importer and not an exporter.  In this framework we will
discuss import demands and not focus on the behavior of the exporters.  The model describes
the supply and demand conditions for agricultural inputs and outputs. 2
'Recently,  South Korea  announced changes  in customs  policy which should expedite the
customs  process  for imported  products.  The new  procedures  involve only sampling  the
imported products and inspecting the samples  after the products have left the customs area.
The period from sampling to inspection is designed to take only three days and therefore, in
the case of a problem, the products may be recalled before they reach retailers.  How well
this policy will be implemented  is not yet certain.
2See Sumner 1995c; Anderson  1989; and Anderson and Warr 1987.
275a)  D i = D'(pl,..,pk;z)
b)  pi =  C'(w1,...
,w ,y i) / o y i
c)  Xif =  ci(.)/wf
d)
e)
xf =  Ei xf
xf =  g(wf)
for i= 1,...,k;  where Di is total domestic demand for good i, pi
is the price of good i, and z is a vector of exogenous variables.
price = marginal cost of yi, for i=1,...,k; where yi is the domestic
production of good i, C'(.)  is the cost function for yi, and  wf is
the price of input f where f= 1,...,n.
derived  demand  for  input  f in industry  i, for i=1,...,k,  and
f= 1,...,n;  where  x'f  is  the  quantity  of input  f  used  in  the
production of good i.
total demand for input f,  f-1,...,n.
supply of input f, f=-1,...,n.
We will leave aside domestic farm subsidies.  Trade and trade policy may be introduced
into the model by setting the product market equilibrium as:
f)  Di =i  i  +  mi
In general,
g)  mi = m(pmi)
equilibrium  condition for output i market,  for i= 1,...,k;  where
qi  is the  quantity of imports of good  i subject to an absolute
import quota (or tariff rate quota for the range over which the
low or zero tariff applies) and mirepresents the imports of good
i  subject to tariffs.
supply function for imports of good i for i = 1,...,k; where pi
is  the  importer's  price,  which  is  usually  the  domestic  price
minus the specific tariff, ri,  (p1i= Pi -t),  of course ad valorem
tariffs are only slightly different.
The model treats imports and home-produced  goods as identical.  An alternative  is to
treat  them  as  non-homogeneous.  In  that  specification  prices  of import  goods  may  be
introduced in equation set (a) as (less than perfect)  substitutes for the home-produced  good.
The demand for each good depends on the prices of other goods as well as its own price.
This demand equation may include variables exogenous to the model,  including (in the small
country case) prices of imported goods.  The demand  curves may also be affected by S&P
and  other  technical  rules  affecting  the  market.  Equation  set  (b),  the  cost-minimizing
conditions for domestic production  of good i, yields the supply response  function for each
produced  good i.  (There  are no  explicit  supply  functions for domestic  goods  specified.)
With n inputs for each commodity,  there are kxn derived  input demand  equations.  Equation
set (f) describes  a market equilibria under which total demands for goods equals the sum of
domestic production,  the import  quota-quantities,  and imports that are  limited by tariffs.
Trade and trade policy enter the model here for goods that are homogeneous  so that imports
and home-produced  goods are perfect substitutes.  SPS barriers and other trade rules affect
this equation.  Equation set (g) represents  the supply functions for imports into the market.
Import  supplies  are potentially  upward  sloping  functions  of the  net  price  received.  An
upward sloping supply curve  is used when  any conditions cause the net price received to be
276a function  of the quantity imported.  These conditions may include regulations  and import
barriers.
For simplicity the cost function has the following form for all i:
C'(w 1,...,wn,  i) = ci(w 1,...,wn)h(yi),
where C'(.)  is a well-defined  cost function with the usual properties, implying that function
c'(.)  is  non-decreasing,  concave,  and  linearly  homogeneous  in  input  prices,  and  h(y)  is
increasing  in y.  The underlying technology for the above cost function is homothetic.
The Model in Log Differential  Form:  An Example
To  provide specificity,  we illustrate the case of crop agriculture  in an importing nation
with four outputs  and three inputs.  We used the model to  simulate the following policy
scenario:
o  The  minimum  access  of rice is  increased  from zero to  a percentage  of the no-import
consumption level of rice.
o  Initially, imported horticultural crops are subject to an ad valorem tariff  The policy shock
is a tariff reduction.  Imported  and home-produced  goods  are perfect substitutes.  The
domestic price equals the import price plus the tariff.
o  For other tradable crops, there already exists a large market  share of imported  crops with
a open border.  The country has no market power in the international market.  Thus, there
is no change in the import price and thus the domestic price.
Totally differentiating the equations in the basic model and rewriting in elasticity terms
yields the following system of equations.  Carets denote the proportional  changes; r, h, t, and
n index rice, horticultural  crops, other tradable crops and non-tradable  crops; and three inputs
(land, labor,  and purchased inputs) are indexed by 1, 2,  and 3.
1.1)  + dq/Dr  Z='rij Pj,  j=r,h,t,n
1.2)  (sh)  h  +  (1-Sh)lh  Ej T hj pj
1.3)  (st)  9t  +  (1-st)t  =  jtj Pj
1.4)  gn =  Ej=  njj
2)  Pj  "  EfJ* 
+  pi  i,  f=1,2,3,  Vj (=r,h,t,n)
3.1)  kJ 1  =--  (YJ1  &21  +  yJ1  0 J3 1)  1  -- "J 1   J21  '2  +  y 1  cJ 31  \r3  +  j,  Vj (-r,h,t,n)
3.2)  J2 =-  (yJl uJ21 +2  (J 32) '2 
1  J21  1  - - yJ2  u' 32  3  +j  ,  Vj  (=r,h,t,n)
3.3)  k 3 =  -(yJl  31  + yJ2  &32)  "3  +  yJl  31  +  yJ2  &32  2  +  j,  Vj  (=r,h,t,n)
5)  th  Pmh
277where new parameters  are:
j:  Demand elasticity of output i with respect to the price of output j
sh:  Market share of domestic production in the horticultural  market
st:  Market  share of domestic production in the market for tradable crops
yf.:  Cost share of input f in production of output j  ( E ' y=  1)
pi :  Elasticity of marginal cost with respect to output
O  fg:  Allen elasticity of input substitution between inputs f and g in output j industry
Jf,:  Share of input f used in output j industry  (  f=  1)
Ef:  Supply elasticity of input f
(o:  Import  supply  elasticity  of horticultural  products  with respect  to  the  price
received by importer,  where p,  = ph/(l+th).
The system consists of 24 equations including four output demand  equations (1.1-1.4),  four
output  supply equations  (2),  twelve input  demand equations  (3.1-3.3),  three input supply
equations  (4)  and  one  import  supply  equation  for  horticultural  goods  (5).  With  the
predetermined price of other tradeable  crops,  we  solve for 24  variables  which  represent
percentage  changes associated with:
yi, i = r,  h, t, n
mi,  i = h, t
pi, i=  r, h,  n
x'  i = r,  h, t, n and f= 1, 2, 3
wf, f=1,  2,  3.
Imports enter the model in four places.  In equation  1.1,  rice imports and import policy
are  captured by the policy  variable  dq/Dr.  Horticultural  imports  enter in both the supply
demand equilibrium equation  1.2 and in the import supply equation 5, with policy variable i h
implicit in 5. Finally, imports of other tradable crops are included in  1.3,  but, for simplicity,
there is no associated tariff or quota.  SPS restrictions would most naturally  enter the model
in equation 5, but, as we will see, they have the potential to affect the model  in a number of
other ways.
Simulation of the empirical model requires data on, estimates  of, or assumptions  about:
base period prices, quantities,  input-use shares across industries, cost shares of inputs within
industries,  marginal  cost elasticities,  elasticities  of input substitution,  supply elasticities  of
inputs, demand  elasticities of outputs, and the import supply elasticity for horticultural  crops.
Simulation results provide projected  impacts of trade or other policy changes.  The model
may  be easily  modified  to:  a) include  more products,  b)  allow for imports  and  domestic
production to be other than perfect substitutes in demand,  and c) trace the effects back to
specific import suppliers.
278Specification  of SPS and Other Technical Rules  in an Empirical Trade Policy  Model
Technical  trade regulations,  including  SPS  barriers  may affect  commodity  supply  and
demand in a number of ways.  The effects  listed below may occur individually  or together
depending on the nature of the regulations.
The  simplest  of SPS  trade barriers  is  an  import  ban.  One  may  consider  the  cross-
commodity implications of relaxing an import ban by treating the restriction as an absolute
import quota and showing the implications of allowing trade and removing the zero  quota.
In the formulation  above,  equation  1.1  would be used to represent  the severe quantitative
import restriction that was then relaxed  as the SPS rules were liberalized.
Regulations that are not complete import bans, often require  extra services, processing,
delays,  or other responses that increase the cost of the export  commodity.  Some of these
costs may be incurred in the export country before shipment,  others may occur in the import
country before the commodity clears the port.  Sometimes these costs may be modeled  as a
simple addition to the per unit costs.  In this case,  equation (g)  can be written  as a function
of ppi-ii-treg, where treg is the per unit cost incurred to meet the regulations.  Sometimes
costs may be a function of the unit value of the commodity and in this case they may enter a
trade model like  an ad valorem tariff.  Equation 5 in the log linear specification would then
include an ad valorem term, t reg.
Consider a technical trade barrier that requires certification  and additional  inspection of
shipments before they leave the exporting country.  The imposition of new technical trade
rules causes the marginal cost of shipping to a specific market to  shift up.  In the case of a
small country importer, the price facing the import market simply shifts up by the full amount
of the added costs.  This effect is analogous to a specific tariff as long as the added costs are
constant  per  unit.  Thus,  in our  simple model,  a term  treg  may be  added to reflect  costs
imposed by the regulation.  If the new import rules create costs that add  a percentage on the
price, the effects would be analogous to an ad valorem tariff.
Whether  costs  imposed  by  SPS  or  other  technical  trade  rules  are  science-based  or
consistent  with international  standards (as required by the Uruguay Round "Agreements  on
the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary  Measures"  and the "Agreement  on Technical
Barriers to Trade") is relevant only to some questions and under certain circumstances.  For
example, if the rules are arbitrary they may be more likely to be modified  in the future and this
can affect the analysis if we allow for dynamics and perhaps uncertainty related to regulatory
change.
Consider an example in which Japan requires added fumigation of cherries beyond what
is required for any other market, and this fumigation is not a reflection of consumer demand
in Japan (say because it is related to phytosanitary not human health considerations).  The
fumigation adds to costs and has effects similar to an import duty whether the rule has any
scientific basis or not.  In this case, if the rule has no scientific basis it raises the import price
to Japan,  and provides neither tariff revenue nor added plant health in Japan.  A scientific
basis for the rule, say to provide border control on crop pests, means that local benefits to
279agriculture  in Japan would offset (some  or all  of) the welfare  costs imposed  on Japanese
consumers and exporting producers.  With phytosanitary rules, in some cases we may want
to consider the effects of the rule and compliance  on the production function for crops in the
importing country.  Legitimate phytosanitary barriers may affect the parameters  such as yf,
pi and o'fg that determine domestic costs of production.  Looser rules mean higher expected
cost  of  production  and  less  domestic  supply.  One  indication  of  the  illegitimacy  of
phytosanitary rules may be that, if domestic expected costs do not rise perceptively when they
are loosened, then the rules were tighter than could be justified.
Technical  barriers  may  themselves  become  more  severe  as  the  quantity  of imports
increases.  In this case, the (barrier inclusive)  unit cost of the import commodity is an upward
sloping function of the quantity imported.  Such increasing tightness of regulations may be
a function of political pressure by the domestic industry of the importing  country.  Tighter
controls, more vigorous enforcement,  delays in processing, and  similar responses may occur
when imports increase.  Such increasing tightness of regulations may be built into the import
system.  For example, if the number of import inspectors is constant and they process only
a fixed quantity of imports each day, the delay to enter the market intensifies as the quantity
attempting to enter rises.  This case may be quite common.  For example,  delays  at the South
Korean port of entry for fruits likely depend directly on the quantity being imported.  Note
however,  if inspectors  or other import  officials  cover  a variety  of products,  delays  may
depend on the total import volume and not the quantity of any one commodity.  Thus, cost
of import may not be a function of individual commodity imports for those products that are
a small share of imports of a particular type.  This distinction is not modeled  above because
all horticultural products are treated as a single aggregate.
To model this effect the supply function of imports shifts up and becomes more inelastic
as a function  of the way regulations  are imposed  or enforced.  If we  consider the  cost of
regulation as a tariff equivalent t 4(m), where d(z1)/(m)  >0, the parameter  o in equation
5 would become  smaller with the imposition of rules that raised per unit import  costs at an
increasing rate as the amount of imports increased.
Regulations may also affect the demand function for the imports.  Food safety, labeling
rules,  and  other  regulations  affect  the  way the  imported  commodity  is  perceived  in the
importing country market.  In the simplest instance, the demand curve for imports may simply
shift out or shift back when regulations are met.  In one limiting case imports and domestic
goods may be considered perfect  substitutes, with a fixed quality differential that is affected
by regulations.  In general however, a model recognizing  heterogeneity between  imports and
the home-good may include separate demand functions  for each.
For example, rice consumers in Japan may be more willing to consume California rice if
it has been certified by the Japanese government as having met a series of severe regulations.
In this  case,  we  may model  imported  rice  and  home-produced  rice  as  less  than perfect
substitutes,  so  that the  price  of imported  rice  separately  enters  the  demand  function  in
equation 1.1.  The four good model would need to be elaborated to include imported rice as
a separate good  and equation  1.1  would leave imports out of the supply side.  The price of
imported  rice would  be included  on the  demand  sides of equations  1.1,  1.2  and  1.3.  A
280separate  demand function for imported rice would be added to the model,  and regulations that
were perceived  as improving the  quality of California rice would be modeled  as a demand
intercept shifter.
Technical import rules may also affect the cross-elasticity of demand between imports  and
home-produced  goods.  Import rules may cause home-produced  goods and imports to be
perceived  as  more or less substitutable.  That is, regulations  may raise or lower the cross-
elasticity of demand.  Import regulations  on California rice shipments to Japan could raise or
lower the rh3 between domestic rice and imports in equations like  1.1.  In the limiting case of
making  goods  more  substitutable,  trade  regulations  that  convinced  consumers  that  the
imported product really met all the same standards of  the local product could cause the home-
produced  and  imported  goods to be perceived  as  homogeneous.  Alternatively,  labeling
regulations,  such as those undertaken in Japan for fruits and vegetables, may cause goods that
were previously  considered  perfect  substitutes to become  distinct  goods  in the  minds  of
consumers.  The point here is that SPS regulations may not simply shift import supply curves
and it is reasonable to also allow demand parameters to be functions of the import regulations.
Finally  let  us  consider  some  impacts  of SPS  regulations  that  are  less  conveniently
incorporated in the model developed above.
The  specified  model  focuses  on the import  market and  the  effects  of regulations  on
agriculture  in  the  importing  country.  Imported  goods  are  treated  as  homogeneous
independent  of the national  origin.  But,  import  regulations  may  affect  the relative  costs
among export suppliers and thus favor some suppliers over others.  Higher costs of meeting
regulations are similar to differential  shipping costs to particular markets, and may change the
spatial distribution  of trade and  comparative  advantage across commodities.  For example,
Japan's regulations on imported rice may favor imports from California and Australia relative
to imports from China or Vietnam.  The model above does not examine the export countries
individually and would need to be developed further to consider alternative  export suppliers.
Technical trade regulations may create sub-markets in which the importing country is a
large share of the relevant market.  Although Japan may be a relatively  small part of the world
rice market, it may be a significant  share of the japonica-type rice market, and an even larger
share of the market for high-quality japonica rice that can meet tight SPS rules.  This example
suggests that a country may be a "small country" in an overall market, but behave as a "large
country" in a sub-market differentiated by SPS or other trade rules.  Importer market power
may be created by import regulations and this has implications for optimal import tariffs  and
other trade policy as well as implications for trade policy modeling.
Regulations  may  also  limit  the number  of available  suppliers  who  meet  the  import
specifications for a particular market.  If the regulations  impose differential  costs, only a few
of the potential suppliers may find it feasible to enter the market.  Trade rules that effectively
limit the number of sellers may create market power on the part of exporters.  If imports are
a large share of  the domestic market or if home-produced goods and imports are considered
distinct goods, exporters may face downward sloping  demand functions.  These exporters
may exploit market power  created by the trade barriers that raise their costs but keep  out
281other potential suppliers.  The implication for trade policy modeling is, again, that imperfect
competition may be a function of the technical barriers, whether or not they are within the
international  standards of the WTO.
Measurement of Trade with SPS and Other Technical  Import Regulations
If the costs imposed by regulations do not depend on where the regulation is  enforced,
then  where  the regulations  is imposed  may not  affect  import  quantities  or prices  in the
importing  country.  However,  real  resources  are  used  in the process  of meeting  import
standards  and  new rules  affect  the demand  for services  to  meet  these  rules.  Therefore,
whether costs are imposed prior to shipment or at the point of entry matters to determining
the ultimate cost and benefits to the industries providing marketing  services.
Where  rules  are  imposed  may  also  affect  total  expected  costs  of  complying  with
regulations.  Inspection  at the port of entry,  after  shipping costs are incurred,  have higher
expected costs than inspections at the point of export because it is often costly to divert the
shipment to another market.
Where costs are imposed is also relevant to the data on international trade in commodities
and  thus  may affect  econometric  work and the interpretation  of data on export  revenue.
When import rules cause costs to be incurred within the export country, then export prices
will reflect these costs (Tirschwell  1995).  Data on export revenue will be different if costs
are imposed before shipping,  rather than after shipping,  even though the quantity impact  is
the  same  and  the  import  price  is  unaffected.  For  example,  Japanese  regulations  and
specifications  have added more than $100 per ton to the price of rice exported to Japan from
California.  Thus export value (for 200,000 tons) is at least $20 million higher than if those
same costs would have been added at the port of entry instead.
Complications  also arise in econometric modeling.  For example, when costs are reflected
in the  export price we  observe the  effects  of a new  regulation  as  a movement  along the
demand for export function.  If those same costs are imposed in the importing country we will
observe a reduced quantity shipped without the associated export price increase.  In this case
the  appropriate  price  data  would be  from  the  importer  not  the  exporter.  Econometric
specifications that do not account for where the costs are imposed may be using price data
that do not correspond to prices actually paid by the buyers.
Conclusions
Incorporation of SPS and other technical barriers into empirical trade models remains a
challenge.  Trade regulations may raise the cost of exporting to a particular market, cause the
supply  function to  shift up, and lower  the  quantity shipped.  They may  also  shift import
demand functions in complicated ways.  But, as the discussion above has made clear, each
case needs to be considered  carefully.  The focus of a model,  for example, whether one is
focusing  on the importing country or a specific exporting  country,  also determines which
282features and impacts of the trade regulations  are most important.  For example,  it may not
matter to  importers  or to  overall  trade  flows  if regulations  impose  differential  costs  on
exporters, but that certainly matters to individual exporters.
SPS and other technical barriers  may also change  the nature  of the  appropriate  model
more fundamentally.  For example,  these regulations may create homogeneous  goods from
goods that were  previously distinct.  Or they may create  or facilitate product  differentiation.
Particular types of barriers may cause a small country assumption to no longer be appropriate
for an import market or for an exporting  country.  Barriers  may also create market  power on
the part of individual firms.  None of these issues have been  dealt with adequately  here,  but
they have been raised and  some tentative  suggestions  have been offered.
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